Depression: The role of the self-concept by Power, Michael J.
Anhllse Psicolbgica (1991), 1 (IX): 33-41 
Depression: The Role of the Self-Concept 
M. J POWER (*) 
1. SOME HISTORICAL COMMENTS 
One of the important qualifications that both 
anthropologists and historians remind us of is 
that much of our thinking about concepts such 
as consciousness and the self-concept is culture- 
specific; that is, that our sense of universality 
of the Western notion of the self-concept may 
in fact be misguided. For example, some 
historians have suggested that the first 
individual in history may have been the 
Egyptian Pharaoh, Amenhotep IV. He reigned 
between 1382 to 1379 BC, a reign that was 
remarkable for the fact that he rejected 
traditional polytheism and briefly introduced 
monotheism in the form of worship of a 
universal sun-god, Aton. In fact, he also 
changed his name to Ikhnaton (Akhenaten) to 
signify this religious change. Unfortunately, the 
gods, as they are wont to do, gained their 
revenge; polytheism was reintroduced by his 
successor (ntankhamen), he was seen as a 
criminal, his monuments were defaced, and he 
was struck from the official list of Pharaohs. 
A lesson for would-be individualists everywhere. 
A more contemporary example of the limits 
of our Western approach to the self comes from 
the accumulating anthropological evidence from 
other cultures. To give just one example, it is 
now recognised that the Chinese presentation 
of disorders such as depression and anxiety 
consists primarily of biological type symptoms 
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rather than of the psychological type familiar 
in our culture (e.g. Kleinman & Kleinman, 
1985). An interesting speculation is that lower 
emphasis on the self and the individual in 
Chinese society may therefore contribute to the 
decreased importance of psycho logic a1 
symptoms in the affective disorders. 
The moral from these brief comments on 
history and anthropology is not that we should 
therefore ignore the self-concept in our 
theorizing because it has certain culture-specific 
properties. Instead, it emphasises the need to 
consider unconscious as well as conscious 
aspects of the self-concept. The lower 
importance of the self-concept in other cultures 
does not preclude the possibility of universal 
features that are outside consciousness; cultures 
that emphasise the self and the individual may 
present a certain range of models of the self 
and its importance, though these may bear only 
a limited resemblance to the putative conscious 
universal aspects of the self. The direct analogy 
in linguistics is Chomsky’s (e.g. 1980) proposal 
that despite the vast range of languages that 
homo sapiens has utilised, there may be an 
underlying set of universal rules from which the 
rules for a particular languages are derived. 
Nevertheless, the fact that certain characteristics 
of the self-concept are culture-specific must 
act as a warning against hasty extrapolations 
from our own culture-based research and theory. 
With these comments in mind, some of the 
major theories developed in the late 19th 
and early 20th century will be briefly 
summarised in order to provide the background 
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against which more recent theories should be 
viewed. 
1.1. William James 
In his classic work The Principles of 
Psychology, William James (1907) presented a 
complex model of the self, a model that is as 
good as most current today. James emphasised 
the pluralistic nature of the self; namely, that 
in the normal individual there are a number 
of competing selves which may be in conflict 
with each other. According to different times, 
different relationships, and different situations 
therefore a different self may be dominant. 
However, in order that one particular self is 
dominant or expressed, the other selves must 
be suppressed so that they do not have executive 
control. 
1.2. Pierre Janet 
Janet was the French psychiatrist who was 
famous partly for his lifetime battle with Freud 
claiming that he had thought of Freud’s ideas 
before Freud had. Nevertheless, there were a 
number of substantial contributions that Janet 
made in his own right (see e.g. Reed, 1985, for 
an account of Janet’s substantial contribution 
to our understanding of obsessional-compulsive 
disorder). 
One of Janet’s proposals was the development 
of so-called Dissociationist Theory. The basic 
theory is that consciousness can split or 
dissociate into a number of separate parts that 
can act separately from each other; for example, 
in somnambulistic, hypnotic, and fugue states 
the individual has a limited degree of 
consciousness and may talk, relate adequately, 
and carry out complex tasks, yet be unable to 
recall and deny knowledge of that state when 
normal consciousness returns. Janet further 
proposed that  the potential for such 
dissociations was not present in everybody, but, 
rather, occurred as a result of hereditary 
weakness and therefore was limited to 
individuals such as the feeble-minded and the 
hysterical. 
1.3. Breuer and Freud (1895) 
In a much lesser known theory than that 
presented by Freud in his later work, Breuer 
and Freud (1895) presented a modified 
dissociationist theory to explain hysteria. 
Although the part of Studies on Hysteria in 
which the theory was expounded was written 
by Josef Breuer, the fact that the book was 
jointly authored indicates that the proposals 
must have satisfied Freud at that point in time; 
presumably, the lifelong animosity already 
alluded to with Janet and the subsequent break 
with Breuer led to Freud ignoring dissociations 
of consciousness as an important psychic 
mechanism, but, instead, choosing to focus on 
repression as the main mechanism (see e.g. 
Power & Brewin, 1991). 
In their revision of Janet’s dissociationism, 
Breuer and Freud argued that dissociations of 
consciousness did not result from a weakness 
of the ego due to heredity, but, rather, they 
arose from habitual ways of thinking and feeling 
and therefore could appear in everybody, not 
just hysterics and the feeble-minded. They 
likened such dissociations to the learning of 
mechanical skills, which, with pratice, can be 
performed automatically or near-automatically. 
It was therefore an excess of efficiency rather 
than a deficiency that led to dissociations of 
consciousness. The revisions suggested by Breuer 
and Freud are in many ways identical to those 
suggested by Hilgard (1977) in his more recent 
revision of dissociationism. 
1.4. Freud 
As already mentioned, Freud subsequently 
ignored dissociationism in his later work and 
focused much more on repression and the 
dynamic unconscious, that is, the defensive 
excIusion of material from consciousness rather 
than splits in consciousness itself. Indeed, in 
his last or so-called structural model of the 
mind Freud (1923) presented a tripartite division 
into Id, Ego, and Superego. These terms, which 
were introduced in the English translation of 
Freud’s work, have of course entered the 
common vocabulary for talking about the self- 
concept. However, in order to understand some 
of the later psychoanalytic approaches to 
the self-concept, it is necessary to consider 
Freud’s earlier paper Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917) rather than his own later 
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developments which were foreshadowed in this 
paper. 
Freud’s paper Mourning and Melancholia 
(1917) is a short classic which, apart from its 
important distinction between depression 
(melancholia) and grief (mourning), also 
‘contains the prototype of the Superego and the 
introduction by Freud of object relations. In 
this paper, Freud argued that melancholia and 
mourning are both very similar states, in that 
there is a loss of a significant cathected object. 
However, the difference is that in melancholia 
the Ego turns against part of itself with self- 
blame and self-denigration, and, in the extreme, 
these attacks on the self result in suicide. Freud 
considered that most significant relationships 
have some degree of ambivalence [though in 
a revealing exception to this rule, Freud 
elsewhere suggests that the one non-ambivalent 
relationship is that between mother and son, 
(see e.g. Gay, 1988)], but the introjection of such 
objects or relationships can lead to  a 
displacement of attacks on the object to attacks 
on the introjected object or that part of the Ego 
identified with the object. Subsequently, analysts 
have presented reformulations of this basic 
argument, some of which will be considered 
later, nevertheless, Freud pointed to a number 
of important mechanisms in this and other work 
that a satisfactory model of the self has to 
address. 
In summary, the theories presented by James, 
Janet, Breuer and Freud, have a number of 
points of overlap which should provide the 
starting point for modern theories of the self- 
concept. Unfortunately, the rise of behaviourism 
within 20th century psychology led to a general 
rejection of topics such as the self, because they 
were considered t o  be unobservable 
epiphenomena. It was left to the work of a 
number of psychoanalysts and sociologists to 
carry the banner forward. Fortunately, the fall 
of behaviourism from its position’of dominance 
and its replacement with cognitive science has 
led to the re-appearance of topics such as the 
self and consciousness in respectable academic 
circles. The warning must be issued though that 
cognitive science needs to re-consider some of 
these earlier theories rather than simply attempt 
to re-invent a more primitive version of the 
wheel. In the remainder of this paper, some 
attempt will be made to outline more recent 
developments and then an attempt will be made 
to draw them together under the umbrella of 
the cognitive approach. 
2. THE SELF-CONCEPT AND DEPRESSION: 
SOME CURRENT APPROACHES 
It would not be possible to cover all of the 
current psychoanalytic, social, cognitive, or 
sociological approaches to the self in a short 
section. In order to make the task more 
manageable therefore, the focus will fall on the 
relationship between the self-concept and 
depression and how this relationship is expressed 
in Beck’s cognitive therapy and in object- 
relations theory. One of the simplest and 
therefore least satisfactory approaches to the 
self is in Beck’s cognitive therapy, so this 
approach will be considered first. 
2.1. Beck’s Cognitive Therapy 
The main features of Beck’s Cognitive 
Therapy are as follows (e.g. Beck, Rush, Shaw 
& Emery, 1979; see Power, 1989, for a 
summary): 
1. Problems in early significant relationships 
lead the vulnerable individual to possess 
extreme beliefs or so-called dysfunctional 
schemata. These extreme beliefs centre 
around the cognitive triad of the self, the 
world, and the future; thus, the vulnerable 
individual may believe in the need to 
achieve at all costs, or to be loved by 
everybody, otherwise the self may be seen 
to be worthless, unloveable, bad, or 
diseased; 
2. If a major event occurs which matches 
with the dysfunctional beliefs, these are 
no longer latent but become activated and 
thereby play a significant part in the 
individual’s psychological life; 
3. One of the main ways in which activated 
beliefs or dysfunctional schemata affect 
the individual is through the occurrence 
of negative automatic thoughts. These 
thoughts are typically experienced to 
occur spontaneously and may be 
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associated with negative mood changes 
such as experiencing depression or anxiety 
immediately following their occurrence. 
In content they mirror the dysfunctional 
schemata, for example, thoughts such as 
cd’m a failure)), cd’m totally unloveable>> 
or images of injury or death, and so on. 
A characteristic feature of negative automatic 
thoughts in depression is that they are often 
experienced as ego-syntonic; thus, the mood 
state is seen to a familiar one, individuals often 
feel that they have always really been depressed, 
or that they always really knew that they were 
worthless or unloveable. This contrasts with the 
experience of intrusive thoughts that obsessive- 
compulsive disorder individuals for example 
have in which the thoughts are experienced as 
ego-dystonic or ego-alien and which may also 
be highly anxiety provoking. Examples of such 
thoughts might include the urge to shout an 
obscenity in a crowded lecture theatre or to run 
naked through the corridors at work: thoughts 
that are ego-dystonic rather than ego-syntonic, 
for most people anyway! 
There are a number of limitations of Beck’s 
cognitive therapy which have been presented 
elsewhere (Power, 1989; Power & Champion, 
1986), though one obvious strength is that it 
has been developed in conjunction with an 
approach to therapy that has proven of use in 
the treatment of a range of disorders. It must 
be remembered though that the success (or 
failure) of a therapy does not necessarily entail 
the truth (or falsity) of the theory; an early 
example from the history of psychotherapy of 
such a disconnection comes from the famous 
investigation of Mesmer’s claims for the cure 
of psychological disorders through animal 
magnetism (or later simply called Mesmerism!). 
The French Royal Commission set u p  in 1784 
to investigate Mesmer, which included such 
noted individuals as Benjamin Franklin, 
Antoine Lavoisier and a certain Dr. Guillotin, 
concluded that there was no such entity as 
animal magnetism, but that there was some 
effectiveness of the treatment which worked 
through the power of the imagination 
(Ellenberger, 1970). 
To return to the question of cognitive therapy, 
there are a number of ways in which the 
theory’s account of the self-concept are 
inadequate. The main problem is that the theory 
focuses on the content of the self-concept, in 
particular, on the content outlined earlier of 
dysfunctional schemata and negative automatic 
thoughts. There is little account of the structure 
of the self-concept and the processes involved. 
We would argue for example that there should 
be some account of a dynamic unconscious and 
the possibility of dissociated or partially 
dissociated aspects of the self (Power, 1989; 
Power & Brewin, 1991); there should also be 
some account of defence mechanisms or the 
self-protective strategies that individuals 
normally employ in order to maintain their 
positive views of themselves. To give one 
problematic example which has emerged from 
the cognitive therapy literature itself, some 
researchers (Blackburn & Smyth, 1985; Teasdale 
& Dent, 1987) have attempted to induce 
depressed mood in recovered depressed and 
normal control subjects. To their surprise they 
have found that it is more difficult to induce 
a sad mood in a recovered depressive than in 
a control subject, but according to the theory 
it should be easier given that recovered 
depressives by definition possess latent 
dysfunctional schemata which should be 
activated by the mood induction procedure (e.g. 
Velten cards), whereas control individuals should 
not have such latent dysfunctional schemata. 
An alternative approach which can account for 
this finding is to  postulate a dynamic 
unconscious (rather than a latent one) and a 
set of inhibitory mechanisms which can keep 
the activated material out of consciousness when 
the individual is recovered, but this inhibitory 
mechanism may breakdown during episodes of 
depression (e.g. Power & Brewin, 1990). An 
improved model of the self therefore seems to 
necessitate the inclusion of a number of 
psychodynamic concepts. 
2.2. Melanie Klein and Object Relations 
Theorists 
In the earlier discussion of Freud’s Mourning 
and Melancholia (1917) it was noted that in this 
paper Freud first introduced the idea of a 
critical agency, which he subsequently elevated 
to the psychic structure called in English 
36 
translation the Superego. Freud (1923) proposed 
that the Superego is formed from the 
introjection of objects or important others, in 
particular, the child’s parents. Melanie Klein 
and the object relations theorists took this 
proposal one step further and proposed that 
the ego itself is also formed from introjected 
objects. Klein proposed that the young baby 
in the first few months of life introjects good 
and bad objects and part-objects such as the 
Good Mother who is warm, secure, and 
provides food and the Bad Mother who allows 
the child to cry, become cold and hungry, and 
so on. Moreover, Klein proposed that, like the 
early cosmologists who did not know that the 
morning star and the evening star were one and 
the same object, so too, the child does not 
recognise that the Good Mother and the Bad 
Mother are one and the same person. Although 
he was not testing this Kleinian proposal, 
support has unexpectedly come from the 
laboratory work of Bower (1977). He developed 
an optical device that produced for a child 
several images of an object that he or she was 
looking at, for example, that several images of 
the child’s mother appeared in place of one. 
Bower found that in the first few months a child 
was not troubled by the several different images 
and related to each as if it was mother. However, 
later in the first year children became distressed 
by the fact that there was more than one image, 
the implication being that the child now had 
a single unitary representation of the mother. 
Klein proposed that one of the tasks for the 
development in the first year from about six 
months onwards therefore was the recognition 
that the Good Mother and the Bad Mother are 
one and the same person. Klein further 
proposed that this recognition leads to guilt 
about the destructive feelings that the child 
therefore had towards the Good Mother, and 
that resolution of this so-called depressive 
position is a crucial part of development. 
Whether or not the details of Kleinian theory 
are accepted, the important point to take away 
is that in the context of certain poor early 
relationships the child may develop a split in 
the self-concept, one part of which may be 
excessively good and one part of which may 
be excessively bad; thus, a failure to integrate 
these two parts may lead to two comparatively 
dissociated parts of the self-concept that in 
some ways may develop independently of each 
other. Of course, questions must be asked about 
whether this split necessarily or only arises in 
the first few months, and whether it is a 
universal feature of development or only evident 
as a consequence of certain poor early 
relationships. Nevertheless, one of the positive 
functions of depression in adult life might be 
to provide the individual with the opportunity 
to integrate the good and bad parts of the self 
(e.g. Champion 8z Power, 1991). 
A subsequent analyst who developed a 
number of the ideas of Melanie Klein and the 
object relations theorists was Donald Winnicott. 
In relation to the self-concept, Winnicott 
proposed that in some individuals there is 
apparent the development of a ciIi.ue Self)) and 
a ((False Self)) (e.g. Winnicott, 1955, 1972). He 
likened the relationship between the False Self 
and the True Self to that of a mother to a child; 
the False Self develops in order to protect the 
True Self from a mot  good enough mother)), 
that is, a mother or other primary caretaker 
who does not have the ability to serve the 
infant’s needs. In response to this relationship, 
the child may develop a polite, mannered social 
attitude which is acceptable to the mother, but 
this False Self is rigid and prevents growth. As 
a consequence, the individual with a False Self 
cannot experience life or feel real; success can 
be accompanied by an increasing sense of being 
phoney which can sometimes lead such 
individuals to destroy everything that they have 
achieved and thereby shock those who had high 
hopes for them. 
Winnicott’s account of the False Self appears 
to relate to the dissociationist models considered 
earlier; thus, the individual may switch between 
different conscious states some of which are 
experienced as False Self and some as True Self. 
Although the True Self may be experienced as 
completely private the important point is that 
it is at least in part a conscious state. However, 
the split between True and False is not 
equivalent to that between Good and Bad 
considered in Klein’s proposals. For example, 
the True Sdf could be experienced as Good or 
Bad or both, nor does a Good versus Bad split 
imply that one part is experienced as True and 
one as False because both could be experienced 
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as True. Instead, Winnicott has identified 
another possible configuration that can arise 
from the mind’s developmental capacity for 
modular dissociated or autonomous states 
(Power & Brewin, 1991), which were linked 
above to Breuer and Freud’s proposals. 
3. TOWARDS A MODEL OF 
THE SELF-CONCEPT 
3.1. The theoretical context 
Before spelling out some proposals for the 
self-concept, it is first necessary to summarise 
a few points about the theoretical framework 
in which these proposals will be placed. The 
framework is primarily taken from current 
cognitive science, though most cognitive 
scientists would probably disagree with at least 
one of the proposals. However, these choices 
are made with clinical issues in mind in addition 
to the normal theoretical and experimental ones 
(see Power, 1991, and Power & Brewin, 1991, 
for a detailed account of these issues). 
3.1 .l. Connectionism 
The best current functional architecture for 
the mind is that offered in Connectionist 
approaches (e.g. Rumelhart & McClelland, 
1986). The basic device is one in which very 
large numbers of on-off switches are connected 
in parallel with each other; representations are 
distributed over the whole network rather than 
being represented locally by individual nodes. 
This property of parallel distributed processes 
provides significant advantages over for example 
networks with local representation, in that 
damage may occur to one or more of the nodes, 
but the output may still be perfectly 
interpretable. Connectionism is therefore a 
modern form of associationism which Freud 
would have been entirely comfortable with. In 
fact, in the earlier mentioned work with Breuer 
(Breur & Freud, 1895) Freud presented an 
elegant associationist network model of 
autobiographical memory, though one in which 
memories were stored locally at individual nodes 
(see Power & Brewin, 1991). 
3.1.2. Modularity 
Jerry Fodor (1983) and other cognitive 
scientists have very much re-discovered the 
concept of modularity. Fodor has traced this 
concept back to the early 19th century 
phrenologists Gall and Spurzheim who 
proposed that different functions were localised 
in different parts of the brain. However, in view 
of the discussion above of the modified 
dissociationism offered by Breuer and Freud, 
their proposals in many ways provide a more 
appropriate ancestor in that their account is 
virtually identical to that of modern cognitive 
science. This link however has so far been 
completely ignored. 
The strength of the modularity proposal when 
applied to the self-concept lies, we believe, in 
our reinterpretation of the concept; namely, our 
proposal that the brain has the capacity for 
modular organisation, but the form that this 
modularity takes is not pre-determined (Power 
& Brewin, 1991). In relation to the development 
of the self-concept, the self may divide into 
separate modules according to the child’s 
experience of basic needs and emotions and how 
these needs and emotions are handled by 
significant attachment figures. These modules 
are dissociated in the sense meant by Breuer 
and Freud rather than that meant by Janet, that 
is, the dissociation is not simply a dissociation 
of consciousness, but occurs at both conscious 
and unconscious levels. 
3.1.3. The Unconscious 
Amongst the many approaches that have been 
proposed for the unconscious two which are of 
central importance are the Helmholtzian 
ccperceptual unconscious)) and the Freudian 
cc dynamic unconscious)). The German scientist 
Hermann von Helmholtz formalised an account 
of the unconscious in his classic work on 
perception. He argued that normal perceptual 
processes require ccunconscious inferences)) for 
their operation; thus, we do not experience 
objects changing in size as we approach or move 
away from them, but rather object size 
constancy operates automatically. Other 
constancies include colour and shape 
constancies. This particular tradition is the one 
that work in cognitive science almost exclusively 
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focuses on, whether in perception, selective 
attention, memory, or whatever. It is also the 
approach that Beck has endorsed in his recent 
account of anxiety (Beck & Emery, 1985). 
In contrast to the Helmholtzian unconscious, 
proposals about the dynamic unconscious focus 
on the possibility of unconscious goals, 
conflicts, and emotions, which may run contrary 
to conscious ones. They may also directly 
influence action thereby bypassing conscious 
control, and appear as somatic and psychic 
symptoms, dreams, and slips. This version of 
the unconscious is either explicitly or implicity 
denied by many cognitive scientists, and is 
certainly denied by Beck (e.g. Beck & Emery, 
1985). There have of course been one or two 
exceptions amongst cognitive scientists, one of 
the most notable being Dixon (1981) who 
explicitly accepts both the perceptual and 
dynamic approaches to the unconscious. It 
should be clear from the arguments presented 
so far that, like Dixon, we would argue that 
both approaches need to be incorporated into 
a model of the self-concept, though one might 
want to argue about whether the dynamic 
unconscious is cctruly unconscious,, in the sense 
that its repressed content is in principle 
accessible, whereas in contrast basic perceptual 
processes are in principle inaccessible (see Power 
8i Brewin, 1991, for discussion). 
3.1.4. Inhibitory Processes 
One of the weaknesses identified earlier in 
the discussion of Beck’s account of the self was 
the lack of any inhibitory or defence 
mechanisms. Such processes are of course the 
bread and butter of psychoanalysis and, indeed, 
in hi b i t o ry  mechanisms are explicit 1 y 
incorporated into the basic physiology of the 
brain, as well as in psychological theories of 
learning, selective attention, skilled action, and 
so on. Of course, there are a number of ways 
in which inhibition can arise in a passive rather 
than active manner; for example, the occupation 
of a limited capacity processor by one process 
passively inhibits its use by other processes. 
However, the implication of a defensive or self- 
protective inhibition is that it is an active 
mechanism that can exclude unwanted 
information from consciousness (e.g. Power & 
Brewin, 1990). An additional more positive 
sense in which inhibition may be important was 
referred to in the discussion earlier of William 
James’ pluralistic selves in which the currently 
dominant self actively inhibits the other selves 
from gaining control. Similar mechanisms are 
implicated in more recent models in which 
multiple goals and plans have to be coordinated 
in a parallel modular system (e.g. Johnson- 
Laird, 1988). 
3.2. The Ambivalent Serf 
The purpose of the previous sections has been 
to draw together information from a variety of 
sources about approaches to the self-concept 
in general, and then to begin to consider how 
these approaches might be relevant to 
depression. One of the important points that 
arises in both contemporary and historical 
approaches is that the self need not be a single 
integrated entity, but varying degrees of partially 
dissociated modular parts may develop 
particularly in some individuals. A second 
important point is that there is an important 
division in the depressive between good and 
bad, between a positive self and a negative self 
(e.g. Power, 1987). When depressed, the 
individual is dominated by the negative self, but 
when recovered the positive self may again 
become the dominant state. 
FIGURE 1 
An outline model of the Ambivalent self 
THE AMBIVALENT SELF 
Positive Negative 
Actual Actual 
Self Self 
Positive Negative 
Ideal Self ddeal)) Self 
(dtopia))) (ctDystopia,)) 
These characteristics and others have been put 
together in the model of the Ambivalent Self 
shown in Figure 1. The model also includes an 
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important feature first identified by Freud in 
Mourning and Melancholia as the cccritical 
agency)) and later renamed, as part of the Super 
Ego, the Ego-ideal (see above). It is clear that 
one of the sources of self-esteem and self- 
criticism is the discrepancy between the Ego and 
its positive ideal, a discrepancy that has been 
continued in George Kelly’s (1955) Personal 
Construct Theory in the form of the Actual Self 
versus Ideal Self discrepancy, and which has also 
recently been applied to an analysis of the 
quality of personal relationships (Power, 
Champion & Aris, 1988). The model proposes 
therefore that depressives typically have two 
dissociated or partially-dissociated positive and 
negative self-states. Each of these actual selves 
is associated with an end-state towards which 
it aims; a positive or utopian ideal self towards 
which the positive state aims, and a negative 
or dystopian ctideal)) self towards which the 
negative state aims. The well-known novels 1984 
by George Orwell and Brave New World by 
Aldous Huxley present dystopian states which 
to the authors seemed to be possible outcomes 
of 20th century developments. The dystopian 
state towards which the depressive aims is a 
personal one of poverty, worthlessness, 
loneliness, sickness, or death in which everything 
that is of value has been lost or abandoned. 
In contrast, the utopian state may often be 
excessively positive and unrealistic in 
comparison to the normal positive ideal, so that 
the depressive’s successes may still fall well short 
of that ideal and provide little satisfaction. At 
the extremes, the utopian self may become 
grandiose, or the negative self can come to 
predominate the individual even when 
((recovered)) from depression. If the negative 
state does predominate, then the individual has 
little or no access to the positive self-state, 
though in fact such cccharacterological 
depressives)) often have abundant qualities. 
In conclusion, we would argue that the 
proposals for the Ambivalent Self draw together 
many established approaches to the self-concept 
together with clinical and experimental 
information about depression. Nevertheless, it 
is now necessary to embark on a programme 
of clinical and experimental research to test 
the proposals, though its relevance to  
working clinically with depressed individuals 
will be for clinicians to decide for themselves. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper it argued that the nature of depression 
cannot be understood without reference to the self- 
concept and the central part that it plays in the onset 
and maintenance of the disorder. There have of 
course been a wide range of approaches to the self; 
the psychoanalytic and cognitive approaches are of 
particular relevance to depression and therefore some 
attempt are made to identify possible points of 
integration between these different approaches which 
are normally considered to be disparate. A brief 
summary of some of the historical antecedents also 
is provided in order to set the context in which more 
recent approaches have been developed. 
RESUMO' 
Neste artigo defende-se que a natureza da 
depress50 n5o pode ser compreendida sem fazer 
referhcia ao auto-conceit0 e ao papel central que 
ocupa no desencadear e manutenclo da desordem. 
Existem viirias abordagens do Se@ a psicanalitica 
e a cognitiva ocupam lugar especial no caso da 
depresslo. Neste artigo, procura-se identificar pontos 
de convergencia entre estas abordagens. S l o  
igualmente apresentados, de mod0 sumiirio, alguns 
antecedentes historicos por forma a melhor 
compreender o context0 do desenvolvimento de 
perspectivas mais recentes. 
0 Resumo C da responsabilidade da Redacclo. 
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